It is well known that if bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs a …rst-or second-price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller's value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue, and leaves bidders with no surplus. Further, in mixed strategy entry equilibria, social surplus and seller revenue decrease with the number of bidders. We show that when entry costs are heterogeneous (and private information) the revenue maximizing reserve price is above the seller's value, a positive inspection fee (and a reserve price equal to the seller's value) generates even more revenue, and in either case bidders capture informational rents. Further, seller revenue and social surplus may either increase or decrease with the number of bidders. Nevertheless, seller revenue is asymptotically the same whether entry costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Our results are framed in terms of screening values rather than reserve prices, and apply to any standard auction.
Introduction
A classic result of the auction literature is that in a standard auction with an exogenously …xed number of bidders who have independent private values, maximizing seller revenue requires screening bidders; i.e., the rules of the optimal auction are such that a bidder whose value is below the screening value will …nd it unpro…table to bid. Moreover, the optimal screening value is above the seller's value and is independent of the number of bidders -see Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) . In …rst-and second-price auctions with a reserve price, the screening value is just the reserve price. Hence the optimal (i.e., revenue maximizing) reserve is above the seller's value and is independent of the number of bidders.
In many instances, however, the number of bidders is endogenously determined as the result of costly entry decisions. As noted by Milgrom (2004) , ". . . auctions
for valuable yet highly specialized assets often fail because of insu¢ cient interest by bidders . . . [since] buyers are naturally reluctant to begin an expensive, timeconsuming evaluation of an asset when they believe that they are unlikely to win at a favorable price." Indeed, McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994) have shown that the endogenous entry of bidders has important implications in …rst-and second-price auctions. Speci…cally, when all bidders have the same entry cost, a reserve price equal to the seller's value is optimal both for the seller and society.
In this paper we study standard auctions with endogenous entry, but where bidders have heterogenous privately known entry costs. In the sale of a …rm, for example, prospective buyers may face di¤erent regulatory restrictions: some bidders may have to seek approval by regulatory authorities while others may not. Hence di¤erent bidders may have substantially di¤erent costs of discovering their value for the …rm.
In Internet auctions a bidder's cost of discovering her value is the opportunity cost of her time, and it varies across bidders. Our theoretical analysis provides a richer framework for empirical studies of Internet auctions using data either from the …eld or from experiments -e.g., Reiley (2006) .
In our setting, like in McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994) , bidders simultaneously choose whether to enter the auction. Each bidder who enters the auction observes her value for the object and then bids. Our setting di¤ers in that each bidder's entry cost is an independent draw from a common distribution, and is privately observed prior to entry.
Heterogeneity in entry costs alters the conclusions obtained for the homogenous entry cost case. We show that while a screening value equal to the seller's value remains socially optimal, the revenue maximizing screening value is above the seller's value. Thus, in …rst-and second-price auctions the revenue maximizing reserve price is above the seller's value.
When entry costs are homogenous, the seller has no incentive to charge an inspection fee or subsidy (i.e., a fee which a bidder must pay, in addition to her entry cost, in order to learn her value). 1 We show that when entry costs are heterogeneous, if an inspection fee is feasible, then the optimal screening value is, once again, the seller's value, and the optimal inspection fee is positive. In other words, to maximize revenue the seller screens bidders according to entry costs but not according to values (for values exceeding the seller's value). As a consequence, there is less entry than would be socially optimal.
In order to understand the intuition for our results, it is useful to review the results and intuition when entry costs are homogeneous. Let us assume for simplicity that the seller's value for the object is zero. A key result in this setting is that in a standard auction with a screening value of zero the contribution to social surplus of an additional bidder is exactly equal to the bidder's expected utility to entering. 2 Thus, when entry costs are homogeneous, the interests of an entrant and society are aligned:
a bidder enters only if her expected utility to entering is above her entry cost; that is, only if her contribution to social surplus is positive. Since bidders enter the auction so long as their contribution to social surplus is positive, the number of entering bidders maximizes social surplus. If the auction is su¢ ciently competitive, then in equilibrium each bidder is indi¤erent between entering or not. Therefore bidder surplus is competed away and the seller captures the entire social surplus. Hence a screening value equal to zero maximizes both seller revenue and social surplus.
When entry costs are heterogeneous a version of the key result described above 1 In the literature, "entry fee"usually refers to a fee paid by the bidder to submit a bid when she already knows her value. Such a fee is captured in our setting through its e¤ect on the screening
value. An inspection fee is paid by a bidder before learning her value. 2 A version of this result is established in Engelbrech-Wiggans (1993)'s Proposition 1, and is also observed in both McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Levin and Smith (1994) .
also holds: in a standard auction with a screening value of zero the contribution to social surplus of a marginal increase of the equilibrium entry threshold is proportional to the bidder's expected utility to entering; that is, the interests of bidders and society are also aligned when entry costs are heterogenous. Consequently, a standard auction with a zero screening value maximizes social surplus whether entry costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous. With heterogeneous entry costs, however, not all bidder surplus is competed away by entry: whereas the surplus of a bidder with an entry cost equal to the equilibrium threshold is exactly zero, the surplus of bidders with lower entry costs (who also enter) is positive. Therefore bidders capture a positive share of the surplus. Hence, even though setting a positive screening value reduces total surplus, it increases the seller's share of social surplus and, as we show, increases revenue.
In fact, when entry costs are heterogeneous the optimal screening value is above the seller's value regardless of the distribution of entry costs, and depends on the number of bidders as well as on the distribution of values and entry costs. (As noted above, however, an even greater revenue can be obtained with a positive inspection fee and a screening value of zero.) The optimal screening value, however, is always below the screening value that is optimal when the number of bidders is exogenously …xed.
There is another important di¤erence between homogeneous and heterogeneous entry costs. For homogeneous entry costs, Levin and Smith (1994) show that seller revenue decreases with the number of bidders in an entry equilibrium in mixed strategies. We describe simple examples that show that a direct extension of this result does not hold when entry costs are heterogeneous: even if the number of bidders is such that a bidder enters with probability less than one, an increase in the number of bidders may either increase or decrease seller revenue depending upon the distribution of values and entry costs.
Auctions with homogenous and heterogeneous entry costs are, however, closely related as the number of bidders grows large. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we layout the basic setting. Section 3 reviews the results for homogenous entry costs. Section 4 presents our results for heterogenous entry costs. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
Consider a market for a single object for which there are N risk-neutral bidders and a risk-neutral seller. In this market the object is allocated using a standard auction (i.e., the auction rules are anonymous and allocate the object to the highest bidder).
Each bidder must decide whether to enter the auction, and thereby incur an entry cost. A bidder who enters the auction learns her value, and then bids. Assume that each bidder enters the auction with probability p: Then the number of bidders follows a binomial distribution B(N; p): Write p N n (p) for the probability that exactly n 2 f0; 1; : : : ; N g bidders enter. It will be useful to calculate the seller revenue and the expected utility of a bidder in a standard auction with a screening value v 2 [0; v], where v is independent of the number of actual bidders n. (The screening value is the minimum value for which bidding is worthwhile; i.e., the lowest bidder type that bids -see Riley and Samuelson (1981) .) Assuming that bidding strategies form an increasing symmetric equilibrium of the auction, then by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) seller revenue is
where
The expected utility to a bidder entering the auction is
Here (v; n) and u(v; n) are seller revenue and bidder utility, respectively, in a standard auction with screening value v and n actual bidders -see Riley and Samuelson (1981) for these formulas. We study the symmetric equilibria of the entry game. In this game, the payo¤ to a bidder who enters, when every other bidder enters with the same probability p; is U (v; p) minus her entry cost.
By the RET, in a standard auction the screening value captures everything about the rules of the auction that is payo¤-relevant; e.g., the amount of the reserve price, the size of the entry fee, etc. Our assumption that the screening value is independent of the number of actual bidders, n, is appropriate when either (i) bidders do not observe the number of entering bidders so that their bidding strategies are independent of n, or (ii) the rules of the auction are such that the screening value is the same for every n. The latter holds in …rst, second, and k th price auctions, for example, where the screening value equals the reserve price regardless of the number of bidders.
In this case whether bidders observe the number of entrants is irrelevant (i.e., their payo¤s in the entry game are the same). In contrast, in an all-pay auction with a …xed reserve, the screening value depends of the number of bidders. In this case the formulas above describe the payo¤s in the entry game only if bidders do not observe the number of entrants. 4 Note that (v; n) is increasing in n and u(v; n) is decreasing in both v and n. It is easy to see that U (v; p) is decreasing in p: If p 00 > p 0 , then B(N; p 00 ) …rst order stochastically dominates B(N; p 0 ); and therefore since u(v; n) is decreasing in n; we
In an auction with n 2 f1; : : : ; N g bidders and a screening value v 2 [0; v], the gross social surplus, i.e., the social surplus ignoring entry costs, is
Note that s(v; n) is decreasing in v and increasing in n. We adopt the convention s(0; 0) = 0. It is easy to show that
where V (n) is the highest order statistic of fV 1 ; : : : ; V n g.
Proposition 1 below establishes that in a standard auction where the screening value is zero the expected utility of each bidder is equal to the contribution to social surplus of the n-th bidder to enter. We provide a simple proof of this result in the Appendix. A version of this formula is established in Proposition 1 of EngelbrechtWiggans (1993).
Proposition 1. For n 2 f1; : : : ; N g: u(0; n) = s(0; n) s(0; n 1):
As will be seen later, this fact is key to understanding the intuition for our results.
Homogenous entry costs
In this section we derive existing results and simple extensions that identify the optimal screening value (i.e., the screening value that maximizes seller revenue) for the case of homogenous entry costs. Note that for every value v 2 [0; v] there is a standard auction with v as the screening value; e.g., a …rst-or second-price auction with a reserve price r = v.
Suppose that all bidders have the same …xed entry cost c > 0: We assume that
This assumption rules out uninteresting equilibria in which either every bidder enters or no bidder enters.
In this setting McAfee and McMillan (1987) establish that in a pure strategy entry equilibrium of a …rst-price sealed-bid auction with a zero reserve price (i) the maximum social surplus is realized (i.e., the socially optimal number of bidders enters the auction and the object is allocated to the bidder with the maximum value), and
(ii) the seller captures the entire surplus; hence (iii) the optimal reserve price is zero. Levin and Smith (1994) show that results analogous to (i)-(iii) hold in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of any auction " ... for which a bidder wins and pays for the item only if his bid is the highest."It is straightforward to extend these results to any standard auction. In particular, any standard auction with a screening value of zero maximizes seller revenue. This exercise will help provide intuition for our results for the perhaps more realistic case where entry costs are heterogenous.
The maximum social surplus that can be achieved by any mechanism with a …xed number n of bidders is
A standard auction with a screening value equal to zero attains this maximum. Write w = max n2f0;1;:::;N g w(n):
Since u(0; n) = s(0; n) s(0; n 1) by Proposition 1, then the social contribution of the n-th bidder is
Since u(0; n) is decreasing in n this contribution is decreasing in n.
Consider the incentives of bidders when they sequentially decide whether to enter a standard auction with a zero screening value. The n-th bidder enters if her payo¤ to entering is at least her cost, i.e., if
As shown above, the left hand side of this expression is just the social contribution of the n-th bidder. Hence, when the screening value is zero a bidder enters if and only if her entry raises social surplus. Therefore in a pure strategy entry equilibrium the number of entering bidders n maximizes social surplus; i.e., w(n ) = w : If we ignore that n must be an integer, then n satis…es (1) with equality, and bidders capture none of the surplus. 5 This argument establishes that a standard auction with a screening value equal to zero maximizes social surplus and, moreover, the seller captures the entire social surplus. A positive screening value reduces the social surplus and, because seller revenue is at most the social surplus, also reduces seller revenue. Hence the optimal screening value is zero.
The key insight above was that the private and social bene…t of the entry of a bidder coincide in a standard auction with a screening value equal to zero. The same logic applies to symmetric entry equilibria in mixed strategies. If each bidder enters with probability p, then the number of bidders in the auction follows a binomial distribution B(N; p); and the maximum (constrained) social surplus that can be achieved by any mechanism is
5 However, since the number of entrants is an integer, then bidder surplus typically will be positive, and may be non-negligible. When this is the case, an inspection fee equal to the surplus of a bidder allows the seller to capture the entire social surplus. If an inspection fee is not feasible, then the optimal screening value is positive.
A standard auction with a screening value equal to zero attains this maximum. Write
Note that W is a "constrained" maximum surplus; i.e., it is the maximum surplus when all bidders enter with the same probability. 6 Since u(0; n) = s(0; n) s(0; n 1), then we have
i.e., the marginal social contribution of an increase in the probability of entry is proportional to the payo¤ of an entering bidder. In a symmetric mixed strategy entry equilibrium bidders are indi¤erent between entering and not entering; 8 i.e., bidders enter with a probability p satisfying
function. Therefore W = W (p ); i.e., in a symmetric mixed strategy entry equilibrium of a standard auction with a zero screening value social surplus is maximized.
Since the seller captures the entire social surplus, the optimal screening value is zero.
These results are summarized in the Proposition below.
Proposition MM-LS (Homogeneous entry costs -McAfee and McMillan (1987),
Levin and Smith (1994).) In a standard auction with a screening value equal to zero, if bidders follow a (symmetric mixed) pure strategy entry equilibrium, the (constrained) maximum social surplus is realized and is captured by the seller. Hence either a …rst-or a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to zero maximizes seller revenue. 6 It is easy to show that our assumption U (0; 1) < c < U (0; 0) implies the number of bidders n that maximizes social surplus w(n) satis…es 1 < n < N: This in turn implies that if bidders use a symmetric entry rule, then social surplus is below w : Hence w > W . 7 A version of this formula can be found in Milgrom (2004)'s proof of Theorem 6.5. 8 It is easy to see that a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium p exists, is unique, and satis…es p > 0.
Heterogenous entry costs
In this section we study the general case where bidders have heterogenous entry costs.
Speci…cally, each bidder i has a privately known entry cost Z i . Bidders'entry costs Under these assumptions, an entry strategy for a bidder can be described by a number t 2 [c; c] indicating the threshold (the maximum entry cost) for which the bidder enters the auction; that is, the bidder enters if her entry cost is less than t; and does not enter if it is greater than t -whether the bidder enters when her entry cost is exactly t is inconsequential. 9 If all bidders employ the same threshold t, then the number of bidders in the auction is distributed according to a binomial distribution B(N; p) where p = H(t). implies t > z; and U (v; H(t)) < z implies t < z; i.e., in a symmetric entry equilibrium t a bidder enters if her expected utility to entering is above her entry cost, and does not enter if it is below.
We now de…ne a mapping that will describe the symmetric entry equilibrium Proposition 2 establishes that a standard auction has a unique symmetric entry 9 In general, entry decisions are described by a mapping from [c; c] into [0; 1] indicating for each entry cost the probability with which the buyer enters the auction. When H is atomless, however, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to entry strategies described by a threshold. 
is the expected entry cost incurred by each bidder. It is easy to show that social surplus can be calculated aŝ
In this expression, the term
is the bidder surplus.
Given a common entry threshold t 2 [c; c], the maximum social surplus that can be achieved by any mechanism isŴ (0; t): WriteŴ = max t2[c; c]Ŵ (0; t) for the "constrained"maximum social surplus; i.e.,Ŵ is the maximum surplus if we restrict attention to symmetric entry rules.
Recall that a standard auction with a screening value equal to zero maximizes social surplus when entry costs are homogeneous. Proposition 3 establishes that a standard auction with a screening value equal to zero also maximizes social surplus when entry costs are heterogeneous. In particular, the symmetric entry equilibrium threshold t (0) induces socially optimal entry; that is,Ŵ (0; t (0)) =Ŵ :
Proposition 3. A screening value equal to zero maximizes social surplus, i.e., W (0; t (0)) =Ŵ . For screening values v for which there is entry (i.e., t (v) > c), the surplus of a bidder is
where the equality follows from the equilibrium condition U (v; H(t (v))) = t (v): Recall that if entry costs are homogenous, then in an entry equilibrium bidder surplus is zero for any screening value. This di¤erence between the homogeneous and heterogenous entry cost cases has important implications for determining the optimal screening value when entry costs are heterogeneous, as we see shall shortly. Proposition 5 establishes bounds on the optimal screening value when entry costs are heterogeneous. Recall that the optimal screening value is zero when entry costs are homogeneous.
Proposition 5.
If v is an optimal screening value, then 0 < v < v F .
The intuition for this result is as follows: When the screening value is zero, an increase in the screening value has a negative impact on both social surplus and bidder surplus. Since social surplus is maximized when the screening value is zero, the impact on social surplus is negligible. However, its impact on bidder surplus in non-negligible. Hence seller revenue, which is social surplus less bidder surplus, increases.
A similar intuition explains why the optimal screening value is below v F . When the screening value is v F , a decrease in the screening value has a negative impact on revenue holding the entry threshold t (v F ) …xed, and a positive impact on revenue through increased entry. Since for a …xed entry threshold seller revenue is maximized at v F , the …rst e¤ect is negligible. However, the e¤ect on revenue of increasing the entry threshold is non-negligible. 11 
Inspection Fees
Assume that the seller may set an anonymous inspection fee (or subsidy) e 2 R which a bidder must pay, in addition to her entry cost, in order to learn her value.
While a bidder's entry cost represents her own idiosyncratic cost of discovering her value, the inspection fee is an extra cost that the seller imposes on a bidder who chooses to enter the auction. A bidder might, for example, need to view the item for auction in order to discover her value, in which case the seller may charge the bidder for making the item available.
Proposition 6 establishes that an inspection fee enables the seller to obtain more revenue than he obtains by choosing a screening value alone. In fact, when the seller may set an inspection fee, then the optimal screening value is zero. Thus, when bidders have heterogenous entry costs, an inspection fee is a more e¤ective instrument to increase seller revenue than screening bidders by value (e.g., by setting a reserve price or charging an entry fee). In contrast, when the number of bidders is endogenous but entry costs are homogeneous, the optimal screening value is zero, and it is easy to show that the optimal inspection fee is also zero.
12
Proposition 6. If an inspection fee is feasible, then the optimal screening value is zero, the optimal inspection fee is positive, and seller revenue is greater than with no 11 Lemmas 2 and 4 show, respectively, that the total derivative of revenue with respect to the screening value is positive at zero and negative at v F . 12 Of course, often it is not possible for the seller to charge either inspection or entry fees -none of the Internet auction websites allow sellers to charge either fee.
inspection fee.
A sketch of the proof of this result is as follows: If the screening value is positive, then the seller can reduce the screening value to zero and at the same time raise the inspection fee so that the expected utility to a bidder to entering the auction is unchanged. This inspection fee (combined with a zero screening value) induces the same entry by bidders without incurring the ex-post ine¢ ciencies of a positive screening value. Seller revenue increases since social surplus increases while bidder surplus is unchanged.
It's easy to see that a result analogous to Proposition 3 holds for a standard auction with an inspection fee; namely, that social surplus is maximized when the screening value is zero and there is no inspection fee. Thus, the optimal inspection fee can not be negative since raising the fee to zero increases social surplus and decreases bidder surplus (since the entry threshold decreases), thereby increasing seller revenue.
Although the outcome with a positive inspection fee and a screening value equal to zero is ex-post e¢ cient, a positive inspection fee induces less entry socially optimal.
Market Thickness
In this section we study the impact on seller revenue and social surplus of an increase in the number of bidders. When entry costs are homogeneous, Levin and Smith (1994) show that in a symmetric mixed strategy entry equilibrium, seller revenue and social surplus (which in this case coincide) decrease as the number of bidders increases. Simple examples show that a direct extension of the result of Levin and Smith (1994) We show that as the number of bidders N grows large, the asymptotic properties of equilibrium in Levin and Smith (1994) 
Further, a screening value equal to zero is asymptotically optimal. 
Conclusions
The conclusions obtained when entry costs are homogeneous, namely that (i) the optimal screening value is the seller's value, (ii) social surplus is maximized at the optimal screening value, and (iii) the seller captures the entire social surplus, are not robust to the introduction of heterogeneity in entry costs. In the generic case of heterogeneous entry costs, we rather …nd that (I) the optimal screening value is above the seller's value; (II) the social surplus is less than the (constrained) maximum surplus -because a screening above the seller's value both induces less entry than would be socially optimal and generates ex-post ine¢ cient outcomes with positive probability; and (III) seller revenue is less than the social surplus -heterogeneity of entry costs generates informational rents, allowing bidders to capture a positive share of the social surplus. While auctions are of greatest interest for small numbers of bidders, as the number of bidders grows large, asymptotic seller revenue depends only on the lower bound of entry costs c and is the same as when entry costs are homogeneous and equal to c.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For n > 1, by interchanging the order of integration we obtain u(0; n) =
Integrating by parts we get
= s(0; n) s(0; n 1):
For n = 1 we have
Before proving Proposition 2 we establish some properties of the mapping t . We show that t is not a symmetric entry equilibrium. Since U (v; H( )) is decreasing we have
Therefore for t < z < t (v) we have z < U (v; H( t)): Hence t is not a symmetric entry
equilibrium. An analogous argument establishes that no t 2 (t (v); c] is a symmetric entry equilibrium either.
Proof of Proposition 3: Di¤erentiatingŴ (0; t) yieldŝ
Writing p N n for p N n (H(t)); we have dp
for n N 1; and dp
Substituting these expressions and using Proposition 1, we havê
Since U (0; H(t (0))) = t (0) by Lemma 1, we havê
Moreover, since h(t) > 0 and U (0; H( )) is decreasing on [c; c], thenŴ 0 (0; t) > 0 for
for all (v; t), where the …rst inequality is strict if t 6 = t (0) and the second inequality is strict if v > 0.
The following lemmas are useful in the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof: Using equation (4), for v 2 [0;v] we can calculate seller revenue as
Di¤erentiating with respect to v;
SinceŴ (v; t (v)) is maximized at v = 0 by Proposition 3, we have
Therefore since t is decreasing on [0;v) we have
Recall that v 
Proof: Assume that v respect to n; and (v F ; n) > (v; n) for all n 2 f1; :::; N gwe have
Proof: Assume that v F <v: Since H is di¤erentiable, then both t ( ) and ( ; H(t ( )))
are di¤erentiable on (0;v). We have
Since v F maximizes ( ; n) 2 [0; v] for all n 2 f1; :::; N g, we have
for all n 2 f1; : : : ; N g: Denote by p = H(t (v F )) the binomial probability at t (v F ):
In this expression h(t (v F )) > 0 and
is positive: an increase in the binomial probability induces a new binomial distribution whose c.d.f. …rst order stochastically dominates the c.d.f. of B(N; p ) which, because is increasing with respect to n; increases seller revenue. Therefore ẽ; is the same for (ṽ;ẽ) and (0;ẽ 0 ) ; whereẽ 0 = U (0; H(t))) t . Note that bidder surplus is the same and social surplus is greater for (0;ẽ 0 ) than for (ṽ;ẽ). Therefore seller revenue is greater for (0;ẽ 0 ) than for (ṽ;ẽ). Hence the optimal screening value and entry fee is (0; e ) :
We show that e > 0: Clearly, an analog of Proposition 3 holds for an auction with an inspection fee; namely, social surplus is uniquely maximized by setting (v; e) = (0; 0): Assume that e < 0: Hence raising the inspection fee to zero, while maintaining the screening value equal to zero, increases social surplus, and does not increase bidder surplus (because the entry threshold is weakly decreasing in e). Hence seller revenue increases; i.e., e < 0 is suboptimal. Hence e 0:
Further, by Proposition 5, when no inspection fee is possible the optimal screening value v is positive; i.e., seller revenue is larger for (v ; 0) than for (0; 0). And by the above argument, seller revenue is larger setting an inspection fee
and a screening value of zero; i.e., seller revenue is greater for (0; e) than for (v ; 0).
Hence e 6 = 0; and therefore e > 0:
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume c = c > 0. Using (2) we can calculate the social surplus; W N (p); for each p and N: Proposition MM-LS establishes that a standard auction with a zero screening value generates the maximum "constrained" social surplus that can be achieved by any mechanism -see also Levin and Smith (1994) , Proposition 6; i.e.,
where p N is the equilibrium probability of entry. Further, the sequence fW
v] is decreasing by Proposition 9 in Levin and Smith (1994), and hence has a limit, which we denote by W:
For each N , denote byŴ N (v; t) the social surplus generated in a standard auction a standard auction with a zero screening value generates the maximum "constrained" social surplus that can be achieved by any mechanism; i.e.,
We …rst show that
for each N and v 2 [0; v]; i.e., equilibrium social surplus is greater when entry costs are homogeneous than when they are heterogeneous. When entry costs are heterogeneous and the screening value is v, then the expected entry cost of an entrant is
whereas it is only c = c with homogeneous costs. Hence writingp
The above inequalities imply 
